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Abstract 
 
The ‘Normative Power Europe’ debate has been a leitmotif in the academic 
discourse for over a decade. Far from being obsolete, the topic is as relevant as 
when the term was first coined by Ian Manners in 2002.1 ‘To be or not to be a 
normative power’ is certainly one of the existential dilemmas in the foreign policy of 
the European Union. This paper, however, intends to move beyond the black-and-
white debate on whether the European Union is a normative power and to make it 
more nuanced by examining the factors that make it such. Contrary to the 
conventional perception that the European Union is a necessarily ‘benign’ force in 
the world, it assumes that it has aspirations to be a viable international actor. 
Consequently, it pursues different types of foreign policy behaviour with a varying 
degree of normativity in them. The paper addresses the question of under what 
conditions the European Union is a ‘normative power’. The findings of the study 
demonstrate that the ‘normative power’ of the European Union is conditioned upon 
internal and external elements, engaged in a complex interaction with a decisive 
role played by the often neglected external elements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1 I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002. 
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Introduction 
 
“If Europe is to be a credible player in the world,  
it requires more than just soft power.” 
 
High Representative Catherine Ashton2 
 
The debate on the power of normative action is as old as the hills. In European 
studies, the ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) debate has already for one decade 
dominated the academic literature. Ian Manners’ interpretation that the European 
Union (EU) exists as a sui generis actor and that this particular uniqueness 
‘predisposes it to act in a normative way’3 has given a new direction to an already 
existing discussion on the nature of the EU’s foreign policy and the debate has ever 
since revolved around varying scholarly interpretations about whether the EU is a 
normative power and to what extent. The objective of this study is to go beyond this 
Gordian knot and, assuming that indeed the EU exhibits different types of foreign 
policy behaviour, to identify the conditions under which the EU is a normative power. 
This will be done by critically examining a selected number of factors which mould 
the nature of the EU foreign policy behaviour and juxtaposing them with the criteria 
for assessing normative power. 
 
This paper suggests that like any other political actor, the EU has aspirations to 
be a viable global player with a proactive role in the international arena.4 This is to 
say that the EU is not simply a ‘force for good in the world’ but rather an intelligent 
and reflexive ‘force for good’ because it does not indiscriminately apply a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ normative approach but instead adapts it to the specificities of the partner, 
the nature of the relationship and the interests at stake. This explains why the EU 
exhibits different patterns of foreign policy behaviour with a varying degree of 
‘normativity’ in them.  
 
The hypothesis proposed in this paper is that the EU’s decision to act as a 
normative power and its ability to do so depend on a mélange of internal and 
external factors that are engaged in a complex interaction. It should be borne in 
                                                 
2 European External Action Service, European Union @ United Nations, “Opening Address by 
EU HR Ashton at the European Defence Agency Annual Conference”, 31 January 2012. 
3 Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, op.cit., p. 252. 
4 L. Aggestam, “Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?”, International Affairs, vol. 84, no. 1, 2008, 
p. 1. 
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mind that the often neglected external elements have a special role to play. 
Therefore both, the inside-out and the outside-in perspectives are important to 
identify the conditions under which the EU acts as a normative power. In order to 
take the study out of the abstract realm and give it a more concrete underpinning, 
the analysis is conducted within the context of a specific case study, the EU human 
rights and democracy promotion policy in Russia. The selection of Russia as a case 
study is determined by the fact that, by demonstrating how the EU combines 
normative and traditional foreign policy elements, it proves that its normative power 
does not follow a linear trajectory. Depending on the point in time and the partner it 
interacts with, the Union exhibits different patterns of foreign policy behaviour with 
varying degrees of normativity.  
 
Before commencing the analysis however, it might first prove instructive to 
define the main concepts. To begin with, in his study Kratochwil defines ‘normative’ 
action as one governed by norms and subject to a ‘moral point of view’.5 This paper 
considers the concept in broader terms to refer not only to actions but also to 
intentions and outcome. From a theoretical perspective, ‘normative’ is best 
understood by referring to constructivism, which concentrates on normative 
structures, cognitive processes and the role of identity.6 When defining ‘normative’, it 
is inevitable not to mention the rationalism vs. constructivism debate. The academic 
literature tends to qualify these two perspectives where rationalism focuses on 
strategic interests and material structures and constructivism on norms and social 
structures as two opposing sides of a spectrum. Fearon and Wendt, however, 
propose a more convincing interpretation – rather than constituting a zero-sum 
equation, the two coexist in a complex synthesis because neither constructivism 
rejects the role of material elements, nor rationalism fails to acknowledge the 
existence of norms.7  
 
                                                 
5 F.V. Kratochwil, Norms, Rules, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989, pp. 7-16. 
6 R. Price & C. Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons?-Critical International Relations Theory and 
Social-constructivism”, Journal of International Relations, vol. 4, no. 3, 1998, p. 259. 
7 J. Fearon & A. Wendt, “Rationalism v. Social-constructivism: A Skeptical View”, in: W. 
Carlsnaes, T. Risse & B. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations, Thousand Oaks, 
CA, Sage Publications, 2002, p. 68. 
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Being an essentially contested concept, ‘power’ proves much more difficult to 
define. For the purpose of this study, Lukes’ definition will be used, where power is 
defined as “a dispositional concept, identifying an ability or capacity” to cause 
effects.8 The term NPE was first coined by Manners who explains it as “the ability to 
define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics”.9 Nevertheless, this interpretation is 
often criticised for providing a too passive understanding of the concept by 
conditioning it only upon what the EU is, rather than what it says or does.10 More 
persuasively, Tocci remarks that an actor cannot be classified as a power merely by 
the virtue of its existence; instead, she suggests, a genuine normative power is one 
that scores consistently across three key elements – normative declaratory 
objectives, normative means, and normative results.11  
 
The structure of this paper will be organised around two groups of variables. The 
first group, referred to as conditioning factors, are: motivation; internal environment 
and capabilities; external perception; and international context. The first three 
factors are more internally-orientated and relate to elements such as identity, 
interests, Member States’ positions and internal capacity, whereas the second two 
have an external dimension and refer to how the EU is perceived externally and the 
context in which it operates. The other group of variables, also called the assessment 
criteria for normative power, are inspired by Manners’ tripartite analysis12 but also by 
the indicators used by Niemann and Wekker in their study:13 INTENT – referring to the 
genuineness of the EU’s normative commitment and the nature of its objectives; 
ACTIONS – the practices through which it promotes norms; and IMPACT – the extent 
to which change is generated in third countries. 
 
As table 1 demonstrates, all the conditioning factors (vertically) and assessment 
criteria (horizontally) are inextricably intertwined (as indicated in grey) and thus, 
cannot be analysed in isolation from the others. However, as Tocci remarks, there is a 
                                                 
8 S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 2nd ed., p. 109. 
9 Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, op.cit., p. 236. 
10 Ibid., p. 252. 
11 N. Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and Its Global Partners”, in 
N. Tocci (ed.), Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?: The European Union and Its Global 
Partners, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008, p. 1. 
12 I. Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the European Union”, International Affairs, vol. 84, no. 1, 
2008, pp. 65-80. 
13 A. Niemann & T. de Wekker, “Normative power Europe? EU Relations with Moldova”, 
European Integration Online Papers, vol. 14, article 14, 2010, pp. 1-41. 
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 7 
stronger cause-and-effect relationship between a conditioning factor and a 
corresponding assessment criterion, where the latter is a direct result of the former (as 
indicated in black).14 Hence, in this study they are grouped into three pairs based on 
the relationships indicated in Table 1: 1) The motivation of the EU determines the 
seriousness of its INTENT; 2) the internal environment and capabilities of the Union 
determine how it ACTS; 3) the way the third actor perceives the EU and the 
international context determine the IMPACT of its action.  
Table 1: The Correlation between Conditioning Factors and Assessment Criteria 
 
 
Source: Inspired by N. Tocci, quoted in A.S. Makarychev, “Rebranding Russia: Norms, Politics 
and Power”, in N. Tocci (ed.), Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?: The European Union 
and Its Global Partners, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008, p. 157. 
 
The Cause-and-Effect Relationship between Variables 
The objective of this section is to identify the conditions under which the Union 
acts ‘normatively’ by examining the cause-effect relationship between the 
conditioning factors and the assessment criteria. 
 
First Group of Variables – Motivation and INTENT 
The analysis of the first group of variables is organised around two elements. It 
starts with the nature of the EU’s motivation with the intention to identify the driving 
forces in its relationship with Russia. Based on this, it then proceeds to evaluate the 
EU’s normative intent by looking at three criteria for assessment.  
                                                 
14 Quoted in A.S. Makarychev, “Rebranding Russia: Norms, Politics and Power”, in N. Tocci 
(ed.), Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global Partners, 
Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008, p. 160. 
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Motivation 
Russia can indeed serve as a laboratory for exploring the relationship between 
norms and interests. As Johnson and Robinson correctly remark, it is an example 
where strategic interests vital for the EU are at stake that determine the nature of the 
EU’s motivation and, therefore, its commitments and goals towards Russia.15 This goes 
in line with the argument that the EU’s long-term objective, like that of other 
international actors, is to be a global player and, therefore, strategic interests play an 
important role in its considerations.16  
 
On the other hand, Barysch perceptively remarks that prior to 2004, the EU had 
a much more normative intent towards Russia because its immediate instinct was to 
treat it similarly to other East European transition countries by offering closer ties 
conditioned upon Russia’s progress in the area of economic and democratic 
reforms.17 From a present day perspective, however, the EU’s approach towards 
Russia resembles more what Wood classifies as a “pragmatic partnership of 
interests”.18 Barysch attributes this change to the significant differences in outlook, 
perception and approach between the EU and Russia that have emerged in the last 
years19 but one can equally add the increasingly hostile domestic environment in 
which the EU promotes its norms.20 
 
On this basis, we can assume that as a rational actor, the EU adapts its foreign 
policy approach accordingly and in case the partner clearly prioritises interests and 
seems reluctant to concentrate on more normative matters, it is highly likely that the 
angle of the EU’s motivation will become more interest-driven. Nevertheless, this is not 
to argue that the EU’s motivation is completely deprived of any normative 
characteristics. This study argues that while in the case of EU-Russia relations 
                                                 
15 D. Johnson & P. Robinson (eds.), Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations, London, Routledge, 
2005, p. 2. 
16 S. Fernandes “EU Policies Towards Russia, 1999-2007: Realpolitik Intended”, in N. Tocci (ed.), 
Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?: The European Union and Its Global Partners, 
Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008, p. 37. 
17  K. Barysch, The EU and Russia: Strategic Partners or Squabbling Neighbours?, London, 
Centre for European Reform, 2004, p. 4.  
18 S. Wood, “The European Union: A Normative or Normal Power?”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review, vol. 14, no. 1, 2009, p. 125. 
19 Barysch, “The EU and Russia: Strategic Partners”, op.cit., p. 4. 
20 R. Youngs, “ Russia and the Eastern Partnership”, lecture, Bruges, College of Europe, 14 
March 2013. 
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normative considerations are not the most decisive factor, they are still present at 
least at a declaratory level because, as constructivism suggests, they are part of the 
EU’s identity and therefore are reflected in its foreign policy. 
 
Intent 
 This section intends to study the relationship between motivation and intent by 
examining the criteria that Niemann and Wekker use to evaluate the genuineness of 
the EU’s normative intent, namely, the centrality of norms in its agenda vis-à-vis 
Russia, and the extent to which the EU’s normative intentions are consistent and 
coherent.21  
Centrality of norms 
As already identified, the EU’s motivation in its relations with Russia is primarily 
but not exclusively driven by strategic interests. Norms and values only play a 
marginal role; they are of a more symbolic, identity-related nature. It can be argued 
that this pattern is equally reflected in the EU’s intent.  
 
As Fernandes perceptively observes, EU statements are rife with normative 
rhetoric but the empirical evidence suggests different, more interest-driven 
objectives, mainly related to energy security and commercial interests.22 A study of 
EU official documents verifies the validity of this statement. To mention recent 
examples, statements on human rights and democracy are regularly released, the 
statement by the EU High Representative (HR/VP) on the administrative fines against 
‘GOLOS’,23 on the situation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Russia,24 or 
on the Magnitsky case.25 The inclusion of human rights on the agenda for the 30th EU-
Russia Summit 2012 is yet another example.26 
 
At first glance, the normative commitment appears a recurrent refrain in EU 
declarations but does it constitute a substantial part of the EU’s goals vis-à-vis Russia? 
                                                 
21 Niemann & Wekker, op.cit., pp. 7-8. 
22 Fernandes, op.cit., p. 37. 
23 European Union, Statement by the spokesperson of the High Representative Catherine 
Ashton on the Administrative Fines Against ‘GOLOS’, A 230/13, Brussels, 28 April 2013. 
24 European Union, Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation of 
NGOs in the Russian Federation, 170/13, Brussels, 26 March 2013. 
25 European Union, Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Magnitsky 
case in the Russian Federation, A 154/13, Brussels.  
26 European Commission, 30th EU-Russia Summit, Press Release, Brussels, 19 December 2012. 
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The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that has been the basis for 
cooperation between the EU and Russia since 1997 demonstrates a strong intent for 
human rights and democracy – support for “Russian efforts to consolidate its 
democracy” is among the stated objectives of the Agreement; “respect for 
democratic principles and human rights” is singled out as the first general principle 
and reference to human rights and democracy is observed throughout the whole 
document.27 A new EU-Russia agreement has been negotiated since 2008 but given 
that the negotiations have not been concluded yet, the agreement will not 
constitute part of this analysis. The Commission Russia Country Strategy Paper 2007-
2013 reiterates the importance of human rights and democracy in the context of EU-
Russia relations but does not explicitly identify them as objectives in the same way it 
does the other strategic interests.28 This confirms the assumption that earlier the EU 
had a much more normative intent towards Russia which gradually evolved into a 
more pragmatic approach, where interests have been taken to the front and 
normative goals have remained dead letter.29  
 
Consistency 
For Manners, ‘consistency’ means “ensuring that the EU is not hypocritical in 
promoting norms which it does not itself comply with”.30 Russia often criticises the EU 
for concentrating too narrowly on exporting its democratic standards while 
intentionally ignoring the internal challenges related to the quality of democracy of 
some of its own Member States. Russia argues that the EU promotes human rights 
and democracy while it itself is not really an example to follow. For instance, Russia 
has been increasingly vocal about what it considers violations of the basic human 
rights of the Russian-speaking population in the three Baltic states. It accuses the EU 
of depriving these minorities of basic political rights, enjoyed by the other citizens of 
the Baltic countries, which Russia contends goes directly against the very nature of 
the norms and values promoted by the Union.31  
 
                                                 
27 Council of the European Union, “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Establishing a Partnership 
between the European Communities and Their Member States, of One Part, and The Russian Federation, of the 
Other Part” Official Journal of the European Communities, L 327, 28 October 1997. 
28  European Commission, Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013: Russian Federation, Brussels, European 
Commission, 2007, p. 3. 
29 Fernandes, op.cit., p. 37. 
30 Manners, “The Normative Ethics”, op.cit., p. 76. 
31 Interview with a Russian diplomat, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the EU, Brussels, 21 
March 2013. 
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It should be considered that the lack of consistency does not directly affect the 
EU motivation or intent or prevent it from pursuing a normative foreign policy. It does, 
however, have an indirect impact because it certainly undermines the credibility of 
both the EU normative motivation and intent in the eyes of Russia, which in the long 
run is a discouragement or an excuse for it not to converge on the model promoted 
by the EU.  
 
Coherence 
Coherence in this case is to be understood as “ensuring that the EU is not simply 
promoting its own norms, but that the normative principles that constitute it and its 
external actions are part of a more universalisable and holistic strategy”.32 To put it in 
a theoretical framework, this aspect of coherence can be explained by referring to 
the universalism vs. cultural relativism debate. Universalism, on the one hand, is the 
interpretation that human rights are universal, not subject to cultural or religious 
specificities and should be applied indiscriminately.33 Cultural relativism, on the other, 
suggests that, far from being universal, human rights are culturally dependent and 
neither they nor any moral principles can serve as a reference point for all cultures 
because such generalisations equal a denial of the existence of cultural 
particularities.34 
  
The complexity of this debate is reflected in the case of the EU human rights 
and democracy promotion in Russia.  From one perspective, all EU normative 
principles are referred to in multilateral treaties such as, inter alia, the United Nations 
Charter, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 35 , which 
arguably confirms the universality of these norms. The question is whether these 
international agreements are a reliable criterion for determining universality or 
whether they are culturally relative to the Western understanding of norms.  
  
                                                 
32 Manners, “The Normative Ethics”, op.cit., p. 76. 
33 Ibid. 
34 D. Ayton-Shenker, The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity, background note, 
United Nations, March 1995. 
35 I. Manners, ‘The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 35, no. 1, 2006, p. 171. 
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The issue of the universality of democracy as promoted by the EU does not 
prove any easier. Although the Union claims it does not promote a single model of 
democracy but rather the principle of it,36 it is still difficult to find evidence that the EU 
advocates any other model than the liberal democratic one. 37 Russia is clearly 
challenging this claim by putting forward its own model, ‘sovereign democracy’, 
which it presents as an ideological alternative to the European model. The 
ambiguous nature of the question on the universality of the human rights and 
democracy norms promoted by the EU raises doubts about the coherence of its 
human rights and democracy policy, which certainly makes it seem a less credible 
norm promoter. 
 
This section has analysed the EU’s motivation and the role it plays in determining how 
the EU’s commitments are articulated and goals set. The following section takes to 
debate to the next level by delving into the internal characteristics of the EU and the 
action it pursues.  
Second Group of Variables - Internal Environment and Capabilities and 
ACTION 
This part examines the relationship between the internal environment and 
capabilities of the Union and the way they impact its choice of course of action. The 
section starts by analysing the nature of the EU’s internal environment and 
capabilities. It then proceeds to examine the course of action by using as analytical 
framework Manners’ six methods for diffusion of norms, namely contagion, 
informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, and 
cultural filter.38  
 
Internal Environment 
The internal environment of the Union should be understood as the positions 
and attitudes of the Member States that determine the internal dynamics of the EU. 
In the case of Russia, the internal context is predominantly characterised by divisions 
both among the Member States and between the EU and the Member States, which 
                                                 
36 M. Kurki, “How the EU can adopt a new type of democratic support”, FRIDE Working Paper, 
no. 112, Madrid, Fride, March 2012, p. 3. 
37 A. Wetzel & J. Orbie, “With Map and Compass on Narrow Paths and through Shallow 
Waters: Discovering the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review, vol. 16, no. 5, 2011, p. 722. 
38 Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, op.cit., pp. 244-245. 
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as Biscop perceptively observes is correctly captured by the maxim ‘divide and 
rule’.39 That is to say that the EU often demonstrates how “by dividing itself, others 
rule”.40 Consequently, outsiders take advantage of and encourage such internal 
divisions in order to rule the EU group.41 Russia is no exception; however reluctant to 
admit it, it is quite adept at playing off Member States against each other, and 
despite its declaratory statements that it would like to see the EU more united, the 
internal divisions quite well serve its strategic interests.42  
 
The main reasons for the divisions among the Member States are divergent 
national interests, attitudes and approaches towards Russia. Due to their varying 
positions, some Member States still demonstrate a preference for conducting their 
bilateral relations with Russia instead of replacing them with a common EU 
approach. An EEAS official claims that despite the bilateral interests of its Member 
States, the EU has been much more united in its general understanding of how to 
deal with Russia in recent years.43 Yet, internal divisions inevitably show through.   
 
Internal Capabilities 
The nature of the EU’s internal capabilities is equally important for determining 
what course of action the EU chooses to pursue and what means it employs to 
conduct its foreign policy. As Tocci explains, the ability and willingness to act 
‘normatively’ is conditioned upon the levels of dependence and interdependence 
between partners. 44  In this relation, probably the most commonly referenced 
argument when it comes to EU-Russia relations is that the EU is still heavily dependent 
on Russia to guarantee its energy security.45 This dependence arguably translates 
into an inability to bypass some of the cruder material elements of international 
                                                 
39 S. Biscop (ed.), “The Value of Power, the Power of Values: A Call for an EU Grand Strategy”, 
Egmont Paper, no. 33, Brussels, Egmont, The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2009, p. 
12.  
40 Ibid. 
41 C. Hill, “Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics: National Foreign Policies and the CFSP”, 
in J. Zielonka, (ed.), Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, p. 48. 
42 Interview with EEAS official 1, EEAS, Brussels, 21 March 2013. 
43 Interview with EEAS official 1, op.cit. 
44 Tocci, op.cit., p. 19. 
45 M. Morini, R. Peruzzi & A. Poletti, “Eastern Giants: The EU in the Eyes of Russia and China”, in 
S. Lucarelli & L. Fioramonti (eds.), External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global 
Actor, London, Routledge, 2010, p. 32. 
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affairs.46 Hence, it explains the EU’s reluctance to undertake a more critical stance 
on the human rights and democracy situation in Russia for the sake of maintaining 
good relations with a strategic partner.  
 
It should, however, be borne in mind that this is not a unidirectional 
dependence but a mutual one. 47  The statistics demonstrate that Russia is as 
dependent on the EU or even more so48 – whereas Russia is the EU’s fourth largest 
trading partner, the EU is the first for Russia because it provides both a market for its 
gas and foreign direct investment.49 Yet, this mutual dependence does not appear 
to provide the EU with leverage vis-à-vis Russia or with enough confidence to 
undertake more decisive actions. Self-sufficient and increasingly self-confident, 
Russia does not feel under obligation to accept the norms promoted by the EU.  
 
Action 
Having analysed the EU internal environment and capabilities, this section 
intends to examine how these determine the course of action it undertakes and the 
means through which this action it is pursued.  
 
Contagion 
The first diffusion mechanism, arguably scoring lowest in ‘activeness’, is 
contagion. Contagion, Whitehead explains, is a parsimonious approach because it 
does not require an analysis of the considerations or intents of the actor diffusing 
norms. 50  The reason is that contagion is a passive form of a norm-diffusion 
mechanism because it represents an unintentional dissemination of values. 
Therefore, contagion can be equated with Coombes’ idea of leading by ‘virtuous 
example’, meaning that the EU serves as an attractive model by the virtue of its 
existence as an actor with a distinctive international identity.51  
 
                                                 
46 Wood, op.cit., p. 116.  
47 Interview with a Russian diplomat, op.cit. 
48 Interview with EEAS official 1, op.cit. 
49 M. Emerson, “Introduction”, in N. Arbatova et al., The Elephant and the Bear Try Again: 
Options for a New Agreement between the EU and Russia, Brussels, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, 2006, p. 12. 
50 L. Whitehead, “Three International Dimension of Democratisation”, in L. Whitehead (ed.), 
The International Dimension of Democratisation Europe and the Americas, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 5. 
51 Quoted in I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, op.cit., p. 244. 
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In the case of Russia the empirical evidence demonstrates that the contagion 
mechanism does not seem to have contributed to the diffusion of EU human rights 
and democracy standards in the country. Different factors can be identified that 
explain why the “model power” of the Union has failed. 52  To begin with, the 
effectiveness of the contagion mechanism does not depend on the agent, that is 
the EU, but on the willingness of the target country to voluntarily import the promoted 
norms and values. Russia, however, rather than trying to replicate the EU human 
rights and democracy standards, rejects the EU’s attempts to diffuse its norms.  
 
The second element is that, as Börzel and Risse suggest, ideas are emulated 
when they resonate with the specific domestic conditions within the target country.53 
In addition, actors are likely to emulate ideas or standards in order to improve the 
existing system when they are dissatisfied with the status quo or the system is failing.54 
Russia, however, is not only satisfied with its own system but it also seems determined 
to preserve it and even considers the human rights and democracy model 
promoted by the EU a threat to its own system and interests. Given that the 
legitimacy of the promoted norms is a conditio sine qua non for contagion to take 
place,55 perceiving them as being in confrontation with the domestic structure not 
only deprives them of legitimacy but it also means that they might be subject to 
political contestation.  
 
 
 
Informational Diffusion 
Informational diffusion is a consequence of declaratory communications and 
policy initiatives.56 This non-intrusive mechanism constitutes a bridge between the 
declaratory and the operational levels. In the context of Russia, evidence can be 
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found of attempts to diffuse norms through this mechanism, which has been 
ambiguous and the results have been mixed.  
 
References to human rights and democracy figure prominently in the EU official 
communication documents, including the release of documents that address 
matters related to human rights and democracy, to mention the statement on 
behalf of the HR/VP on the outcome of the 2012 presidential elections in Russia57 and 
the declaration by the HR/VP on violence against journalists in Russia.58 Nevertheless, 
the aforementioned internal divisions within the Union have resulted in reluctance to 
adopt a more confrontational strategy to address human rights violation and the 
lack of democratic practices.  
 
When it comes to policy initiatives, the Partnership for Modernisation launched 
in 2010 can be used as an example. Although this initiative is an instance of how the 
EU norms in general are disseminated through the informational diffusion mechanism, 
the example is not that illustrative of how human rights and democracy norms are 
diffused. Even though it incorporates various areas of cooperation its focus is by far 
not on human rights and democracy but rather on the rule of law.59 Furthermore, 
although the perceptions of the EU and Russia converge on what the Partnership for 
Modernisation initiative should consist of, their approaches differ – while the EU puts 
the emphasis on the normative side of the initiative, Russia’s main priority are the 
economic aspects of the partnership.60 
 
Procedural Diffusion 
With procedural diffusion, the analysis moves further up the ladder of 
‘activeness’. Resting on operational action rather than passive diffusion, procedural 
diffusion takes place through the institutionalisation of the relationship between the 
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EU and third parties.61 As mentioned earlier, the 1997 PCA constitutes the legal basis 
for the cooperation between the EU and Russia and institutionalises their 
relationship.62  Nevertheless, since the agreement has been analysed earlier, this part 
will concentrate on another dimension of the institutional aspect – the EU-Russia four 
‘common spaces’ established “on the basis of common values and shared 
interests”. 63  Although a quite promising initiative at first glance, as Barysch 
perceptively observes, soon after its launch, it became clear that there were two 
divergent positions on how to fill the ‘common spaces’, which, however cynical it 
might sound, alludes to the Russian joke that the “defining characteristic of 
space is emptiness”.64  
 
Human rights and democracy, together with the fundamental freedoms and 
the rule of law, figure prominently in the Common Space of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, and are consistently singled out as essential elements of the EU-Russia 
relations.65 As Haukkala perspicaciously remarks, the preamble of the document on 
the fourth ‘common space’ stresses the significance of norms and values, inter alia 
human rights and democracy, as the foundation of the fourth ‘space’ but curiously 
not of the whole relationship.66 The actual road map for the fourth ‘common space’ 
indeed concentrates on technical issues.67 
 
The big puzzle is what accounts for the dual logic? Haukkala’s interpretation is 
that the EU intended to include fragments, namely the ones concerning norms and 
values, in the preamble for the whole road map package, which arguably was not 
an option for Russia.68 However, as Emerson observes, the ‘common space’ in the 
field of justice and home affairs is the area where Russia is a demandeur since it is in 
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its utmost interest to attain visa-free movement of its citizens within the Union. 69 
Hence, given EU’s leverage in this area, Russia had no choice but to accept the 
inclusion of a preamble that explicitly spells out the norms and values promoted by 
the EU.70  
The other point that will be explored in this section is the EU-Russia human rights 
dialogue which also provides the EU-Russia relations with an institutional foundation. 
Regular, six-monthly EU-Russia human rights consultations were established in 2005 
with the objective of providing a forum for a substantial dialogue on human rights 
related issues. A study on the perspectives of the two partners reveals huge 
discrepancies. Contrary to considering it ineffective, Russia seems satisfied with the 
conduct of the biannual human rights consultations.71  
 
The EU, however, sees it as great struggle to engage Russia in something in 
which it appears reluctant to participate.  Despite the EU’s numerous attempts to put 
the dialogue on the agenda, Russia demonstrates a complete lack of 
commitment. 72  Nevertheless, the picture is not as pessimistic as it might seem 
because the mere fact that the dialogue exists is already a notable achievement.73 
However, with human rights and democracy evolving in a negative direction, the 
situation in Russia clearly shows its limitations, explaining why the literature is 
dominated by the assessment that these consultations have been an ‘empty shell’.74  
 
Transference  
Transference is another diffusion mechanism, which represents the 
dissemination of norms through the transfer of material and immaterial assets or what 
Manners calls “the ‘carrot and stickism’ of financial rewards and economic 
sanctions”.75 The EU has been providing financial assistance to Russia since the 1990s 
with the objective of assisting the country with reform aimed at the transition towards 
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democracy and market economy. Financed under the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights, the EU has been equally providing support for civil 
society and NGO initiatives, whose objective is to enable the development of 
democratic practices and a healthy civil society, and to guarantee the protection of 
and respect for human rights.76 Nevertheless, the empirical evidence demonstrates 
that this financial and technical assistance has not been particularly successful in 
contributing to the diffusion of the EU human rights and democracy norms to 
Russia.77 
 
Several reasons can be identified that explain the EU’s inability to use financial 
assistance as a mechanism to transmit norms to Russia. First of all, it is argued that the 
EU does not apply effectively political conditionality vis-à-vis Russia.78 This reluctance 
to adopt a more assertive stance and to attach more restrictive conditionality to the 
provided financial assistance can be attributed to the internal divisions and the 
unwillingness of some MSs to agree on a more confrontational line.  
 
Another important aspect is that, energy- and resource-rich, Russia is currently 
so strong and self-sufficient that it can be a donor itself 79  and therefore, EU’s 
conditionality or potential suspension of financial assistance seem to be of little 
concern to Russia. Indeed, not only does Russia not need EU’s financial assistance 
but it also does not want it since being regarded as a dependent partner is 
considered offensive for Russia’s aspirations.80 Russia’s external actions signal that its 
raison d’être is to regain its lost-for-almost-quarter-of-a-century-now status of a great 
power. The assistance coming from the EU, Russia perceives as detrimental to this 
objective because it hurts its national pride.81  
  
Overt Diffusion 
Manners defines overt diffusion as the “result of physical presence of the EU in 
third states and international organisations”. 82  For the purpose of this analysis, 
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‘physical presence’ is limited to having an EU delegation in the third country and the 
presence of the EU in international organisations.  
 
Russia is an important strategic partner for the EU and therefore, it is 
understandable that the EU is represented in the country through a Union 
Delegation.83 Despite the Union Delegations being in contact with local actors on 
the ground, the reality is that evidence of any more specific activities, different from 
the general functions of the Delegations, is quite difficult to find. Interviews with EU 
officials familiar with the work of the Delegation confirm that its contribution is of a 
more supportive rather than proactive type.84 The activities of the Delegation are 
mainly related to coordination and linked to what is being done in Brussels and if the 
efforts in Brussels do not generate a tangible impact, those of the Delegations are 
equally unlikely to do so. 
  
The presence of the EU in international organisations is equally important to 
assess how effective the application of overt diffusion is. The example that will be 
used is the 2011 European-drafted UN resolution criticising Syria’s reaction to anti-
government protests. The resolution, drafted by France, in close cooperation with 
other MSs and enjoying the support of the Union as a whole, openly condemned the 
brutal crackdown on the legitimate uprising of protesters. 85 One of the principal EU 
norms, respect for human rights, was incorporated within the very basis of the 
resolution. Its inability to generate overt diffusion, however, is clearly exemplified by 
the Russian veto, which Amnesty International classified as a ‘shocking betrayal’.86 
Apart from explicitly demonstrating the EU’s incapacity to effectively disseminate its 
human rights and democracy standards through overt diffusion, it was also an 
unmistakable manifestation of Russia’s vaulting ambitions to regain its ‘great power’ 
status, which instruct its foreign policy choices.87 
 
Cultural Filter  
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Kinnvall defines cultural filter as a diffusion mechanism that has its foundations in 
the correlation between the process of political or social learning as a result of 
transmission of norms and the construction of a political and social identity. 88 
Therefore, it can be assumed that in terms of outcome, cultural filter is the 
mechanism that reaches deepest and creates a lasting impact since it implies that 
the norms disseminated pervade consistently within the political culture of the 
targeted country.  
 
The question of whether the EU has succeeded in socialising Russia into a 
sustained adherence to human rights and democracy standards through the means 
of the cultural filter mechanism is one of the most commonly asked questions in the 
academic literature. The scholarship is more than explicit in its general conclusion 
that the EU has so far not been able to shape or transform the human rights and 
democracy practices in Russia. 89  The analysis of each and every diffusion 
mechanism clearly suggests that factors external to the EU play an important role in 
determining when norms are disseminated successfully. This argument, however, is 
strongest in the case of a cultural filter because its effectiveness rests primarily on 
how the diffusion of EU norms resonates and is accepted in the recipient country.  
 
Kunnvall suggests that the diffusion of norms through the cultural filter 
mechanism can have three potential outcomes – learning, adaptation or rejection 
of norms.90 It is first important to examine the defining characteristics of the Russian 
identity by comparing it to that of the EU. As correctly pointed out, one of the main 
differences lies in the very construction of both identities – Russia identifies itself in 
opposition to other geographical entities and has its identity deeply rooted in its 
glorious past;91 the EU’s identity, on the other hand, is built upon its opposition to its 
war-torn past. 92  This realisation already draws the contours of the discursive 
asymmetry between the EU and Russia. As Bova argues, an examination of the goals, 
values and principles that are characteristic of each of the two political cultures, 
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demonstrates a large discrepancy. 93  As Almond and Verba suggest, the 
establishment of a democratic political system or respectively the adoption of 
democratic practices requires a political culture that is in compliance with such a 
model.94 The inability of a political culture to support a democratic system results in a 
functional impossibility to consolidate it.95  
 
This section has examined the main characteristics of the EU’s internal 
environment and capabilities and the way they have constrained or enable its room 
for maneuver and determined the prioritisation of one course of action over another. 
The next part intends to evaluate whether the Union efforts to socialise Russia into 
converging on its norms have had a tangible impact.  
Third Group of Variables – External Perception and Context and IMPACT  
The final section constitutes an analysis of the external perception of the Union 
and its implications for the outcome of the EU’s human rights and democracy policy. 
It commences by looking at the nature of Russia’s perception of the EU and the 
external context, which will then be followed by an assessment of the impact of the 
EU’s promotion of human rights and democracy in Russia. The analysis will be 
conducted by examining primary literature in the form of reports on the current 
human rights and democracy situation in Russia, from Russian and non-Russian 
sources and by comparing the findings to how the present situation is evaluated in 
secondary literature. 
External Perception 
In order to get the full picture of NPE, it is important to take into account the 
outside-in perspective as well, in this case, how Russia perceives the EU and its 
human rights and democracy promotion agenda. To begin with, Baranovsky, a 
Russian analyst, affirms that the attitude of Russia towards the EU does not follow a 
consistent trend as a result of considerable variations in the perceptions of the 
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different groups, the political and diplomatic elite, the business community, and the 
civil society.96  
 
It should also be noted that the Russian attitude towards the Union is not a fixed 
constant but rather a variable evolving over time in synchrony with the changing 
global political architecture and the growing internal capacities of Russia. This 
change of attitude is illustrated by Lukyanov’s observation that in the 1990s ‘Europe’ 
was the focal point for the post-communist transformation of Russia. 97  Presently, 
however, Russia is a fast-growing, self-sufficient country that has at its disposal the 
energy weapon, as a result of which, factors such as sovereignty and the pursuit of its 
raison d'État have taken priority over any normative considerations.98 This ipso facto is 
not to say that Russian foreign policy does not have any normative underpinning but 
rather that it is characterised by a distinctive value basis when compared to that of 
the EU. Being aware of these normative differences, Russia increasingly sees the EU 
references to ‘shared values’ as not only irritating but also counter-productive.99 It 
perceives EU human rights and democracy promotion as an attempt to teach Russia 
how to manage its own internal affairs, which, from a Russian point of view, 
undermines its national sovereignty.100 
 
This argument indeed goes beyond the mere issue of interference in Russia’s 
domestic affairs. It touches a thin chord in its national pride, the question of ego. The 
image of it being a bon élève in a process where the EU ‘lectures’ it on human rights 
and democracy does not go hand in hand with its ambitious aspirations to reassert 
its status as a global power. In this partnership it is not in Russia’s interests to be a 
norm taker.101 
 
On the one hand, Russia comprehends the EU’s tendency to promote the 
norms on which it is founded as a consequence of its natural desire to interact with 
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partners who play by the same rules and share the same values.102 Yet, it remains 
critical of the EU’s assumption that the values and standards underpinning its own 
integration process and resting on the surrender of national sovereignty might be 
exported universally, including to a state that values first and foremost its own 
sovereignty. Russia regards what it classifies as the EU’s intention to mould it on its 
own image and likeness as a failure to acknowledge that Russia’s political culture 
differs from its own.103 Consequently, Russia has developed an alternative model to 
that promoted by the Union, which it courageously calls ‘sovereign democracy’ and 
affirms is more appropriate for its internal context because it better reflects its 
political and socio-cultural specificities.104 
 
External Context 
Examining all the aspects of the external environment in which the EU operates 
is a task beyond the capabilities of this study. Therefore, the analysis will be limited to 
the neighbourhood region, which will allow drawing conclusions about how the 
interaction of the two actors in a common external context conditions the impact of 
EU’s normative power. 
 
Russia is a regional power in the neighbourhood with its own fundamentally 
distinctive interpretation of democracy and with its own view of regional order.105 
Thus, the EU human rights and democracy agenda finds itself in sharp competition 
with the norms Russia promotes in its attempt to construct itself as an ideological 
alternative to the Union.106 Despite the fact that Russia’s home-grown hybrid type of 
a semi-authoritarian, semi-capitalist ‘sovereign democracy’ model is predominantly 
considered unexportable; by its attempts to export the unexportable, Russia has 
managed to undermine the Union’s democracy promotion agenda.107 Furthermore, 
Russia quite tactically links the neighbourhood issue to the questions of national 
sovereignty. Some scholars not perceptively enough conclude that Russia sees the 
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EU as a competitor in its ‘near abroad’,108 while well beyond that, EU officials are 
convinced that Russia thinks of the EU’s policy towards the region as an unwelcome 
interference within its affairs.109 
 
What is important for the purpose of this study is to establish the correlation 
between the interaction of the EU and Russia in a shared neighbourhood and the 
impact of the EU’s normative action. First of all, the EU and Russia have very different 
approaches to the region – the EU has a value-driven approach with tough 
conditionality attached to it, which does not seem nearly as attractive as Russia’s 
more traditional foreign policy approach disguised in ‘normative camouflage’, with 
many ‘carrots’ and practically no ‘sticks’. 110  Thus, Russia’s policy towards the 
neighbourhood in its present form prevents the EU’s normative action from having a 
tangible and lasting impact, which undermines its ability to act as a normative 
power. In the same vein, Russia’s attempts to conduct traditional foreign policy in a 
‘normative’ manner by taking outside its borders a model that it might call 
‘democracy’ but remains incompatible with that promoted by the EU opens up 
space for a more confrontational approach towards the EU model.111 
 
Impact 
The study on the impact of the EU’s human rights and democracy promotion 
policy on the Russian domestic reality will be conducted by drawing on the 
assessment of the current human rights and democracy situation in the country as 
outlined in the reports of Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, The Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human 
Rights; and a policy paper by the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum.  
The overall conclusion of all the reports is that the human rights and democracy 
situation in Russia has considerably deteriorated following the 2012 presidential 
elections. The most concerning elements identified by the reports in relation to the 
quality of the democracy in Russia are first and foremost undemocratic electoral 
practices, for example the tightly controlled 2012 presidential election that brought 
President Vladimir Putin back to power “after a four-year interlude”112 and alleged 
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electoral fraud in the 2011 parliamentary elections. 113  Freedom House explicitly 
mentions that “Russia is not an electoral democracy”,114 whereas the conclusion of 
the OSCE election observation was that despite being properly conducted from a 
technical point of view, the 2012 presidential elections were characterised by 
restricted competition, lack of fairness and numerous irregularities.115 Equally, political 
freedoms have been considerably restricted. 
 
When it comes to the human rights situation, the picture does not seem any 
brighter. There are three major issues that the reports consistently refer to, notably, 
the introduction of a new law on NGOs, a new discriminative law against the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender community,116 as well as the treatment of human 
rights defenders and the hostile environment in which they operate. These negative 
developments clearly limit the civil society freedoms and demonstrate that Russia 
drifts further away from the human rights model promoted by the EU. Based on this 
brief study of human rights and democracy developments in Russia, it can be 
concluded that the findings of these reports convey an unambiguous message: that 
the progress achieved under President Medvedev, however timid, has turned into a 
regression of an unprecedented magnitude in the past year and currently, there is 
no indication that this downward trend might change directions.117 
 
However, it is important to consider what these findings tell us about the impact 
of the EU’s attempts to promote human rights and democracy in the country. The 
analysis has so far demonstrated that the EU has adopted a strong normative 
rhetoric. Its objectives, although mainly driven by interests, are not completely 
deprived of normative considerations. The Union has to an extent tried to act 
normatively through diffusion mechanisms even though the evidence suggests that 
these attempts have been predominantly unsuccessful. When it comes to the 
severely limited normative impact, however, the picture seems more pessimistic.118 
The negative attitudes towards the EU human rights and democracy norms among 
                                                 
113 The Foreign Commonwealth Office, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office Report, “Section IX: Human Rights in the Countries of Concern: 
Russia”, London, April 2013, pp. 203-209. 
114 Freedom House, op.cit. 
115 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, op.cit. 
116 Ibid.; Freedom House, op.cit. 
117 Human Rights Watch, World Report, “Russia”, 2013, United States, p. 460. 
118 Tilley, op.cit., p. 461. 
BRIGG Paper 2/2013 
 
 
 27 
the Russian political elite have created a hostile environment for the attempts of the 
Union to nurture democratic practices and human rights standards.119 A step further, 
Russia has developed its own endogenous political model, which it sees as an 
embodiment of its legitimate right to have an interpretation of democracy that 
corresponds to its internal context. Hence, as long as Russia continues to follow this 
trend, the EU human rights and democracy policy towards it is unlikely to generate a 
discernible impact.  
 
Nevertheless, there is some light at the end of the tunnel because it would be 
erroneous to conclude that the EU normative action has not had any impact 
whatsoever. On the one hand, the political elite demonstrate a negative attitude 
towards the EU’s human rights and democracy agenda. On the other, however, a 
growing awareness is observed at societal level and even advocacy for the 
principles promoted by the EU. Despite being increasingly suppressed and severely 
limited, the work of local human rights and democracy promotion NGOs, as well as 
that of human rights defenders confirms this argument. Yet, this is still a slow process 
and one should not expect that a profound change will happen overnight because 
“anything worthwhile takes time”. 120 
 
Conclusion 
In its interaction with third actors, the EU is often confronted with the question 
whether to be or not to be a normative power. The objective of this paper has been 
to identify the condition under which the EU is a normative power by examining a set 
of conditioning factors, namely motivation, internal environment and capabilities 
and external perception and context, and their interaction with the criteria for 
assessing normative power - intent, action and impact. The findings of the study 
have proved that the EU’s ability and choice to be a normative power depend on 
closely interlinked internal and external factors with a special role played by the 
external ones. 
 
This paper starts with the assumption that the EU has ambitions to be taken 
seriously and to play a more determining role in international politics, instead of 
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being perceived as a “limp-wristed moral fairy”.121 The analysis has confirmed this 
assumption by explicitly demonstrating that the EU does not always adopt normative 
foreign policy behaviour but has a tailor-made approach that reflects the 
specificities of the relationship with a given partner at a given point in time.  
 
The paper has systematically examined NPE from two different perspectives – 
the ‘inside-out’ perspective, which concentrates on the EU’s declaratory 
commitment and stated objectives, the positions of its Member States, and its 
internal capacities; and the ‘outside-in’ perspective which focuses on the attitude of 
the recipient country towards the norms the Union promotes and the regional 
context in which it operates. The overall conclusion is that in the case of human rights 
and democracy promotion in Russia, the EU has adopted a more traditional foreign 
policy approach, yet not completely deprived of normative characteristics. 
  
When it comes to the EU’s intent, the analysis has demonstrated that it is 
mainly conditioned upon the motivation of the Union. In the case of Russia, strategic 
interests undoubtedly play a crucial role in the articulation of the EU’s motivations 
towards Russia. However, being an integral part of the EU’s identity, and therefore 
foreign policy, normative considerations are to an extent also present and they are 
particularly visible in the articulation of the declaratory commitments but do not 
figure that prominently in the formulation of objectives vis-à-vis Russia. Doubts about 
the consistency and coherence of the promoted by the EU norms undermine the 
credibility of its normative agenda and raise questions about the seriousness of its 
normative intent.  
 
Concerning the actions of the EU, evidence can be found of actions 
characterised by a different degree of commitment conducted through various 
diffusion mechanisms. Yet, the empirical analysis has shown that the EU’s attempts to 
disseminate its norms through these mechanisms have had a very limited success. 
This is often attributed to the internal divisions of the EU, which prevent it from 
developing a united position vis-à-vis Russia and to its dependence on Russia to 
ensure its energy security. Another reason is the fact that Russia increasingly sees the 
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Union’s human rights and democracy promotion policy as an illegitimate intrusion 
into its internal affairs and as disrespect for its national sovereignty. 
  
The impact of EU human rights and democracy promotion is mainly 
conditioned upon the perception of the recipient country and the external 
environment. Russia’s attitude towards the human rights and democracy norms 
promoted by the EU is affected by its tendency to see them as a threat to its model 
of political development. The relative lack of success of the EU in socialising Russia 
into converging on its human rights and democracy standards can be accredited to 
its absolute unwillingness to make any progress towards EU norms. The fact that the 
human rights and democracy situation has deteriorated over the cthe last year 
proves that EU norm-promotion efforts have not had a discernible impact. 
 
Finally, this study has explicitly demonstrated that the normative power of the 
EU is conditioned upon a complex network of factors interweaved in various ways. 
Nevertheless, we cannot fail to acknowledge the predominant role of external 
elements and especially the perception and attitude of the partner. This realisation 
leads to another important conclusion that although the EU is often accused of not 
being a genuine normative power, it is not solely to blame when one considers that 
its capacity to act as a normative power equally depends on the response of the 
partner country. Otherwise said, ‘to be or not to be a normative power’ is certainly 
one of the existential dilemmas in the EU foreign policy. Yet, one should bear in mind 
that it takes two to be a normative power – an agent that consistently follows 
through with normative commitments and pursues normative actions and a recipient 
that is willing and able to adopt the promoted norms and internalise them. 
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